安大略省高等法院發現，當終身權益的主體去世時，遺產受託人有權出售不動產，而不是將所有權轉移給受益人。
該案由遺產受託人凱瑟琳·馬克勒法斯（Katherine Markolefas）（申請人）和她的兄弟布拉德利·謝菲爾德（Bradley Sheffield）（被告）提出異議。他們是加里·謝菲爾德（遺囑人）和唐娜·謝菲爾德唯一倖存的孩子。
立遺囑人於 2020 年去世，根據他的遺囑，他的遺孀被授予「只要有能力」就有權在有爭議的財產中居住，並繼續「負責稅收、水電費和保險」。該寡婦於 2023 年去世，遺囑人的遺囑規定，該財產隨後將「按人均平分」轉移給申請人和被告。
申請人稱，在其母親終身租賃期間，她和被申請人沒有進行必要的維修和保養，也不允許申請人親自進行維修和保養，導致房產惡化，也沒有保險。因此，申請人尋求命令，允許遺產委員會出售該房產，並阻止被告從該房產中移除遺產資產。
被告繼續住在該房產，並辯稱遺囑賦予了佔有權，所以有權佔用該財產。他辯稱，他和申請人對財產的權益在立遺囑人死亡時歸屬，包括根據其母親的終身租賃擁有財產的權利。被告並聲稱，他們對財產的佔有權是在母親去世時明確的。
相反地，申請人則認為她有權清算遺產的所有遺產資產並以現金分配。她辯稱，遺囑並沒有要求她為被告的利益保留財產或將他的財產份額以實物形式分配給他。
法院指出，立遺囑人的遺囑並沒有規定如何贈與財產或如何傳遞所有權。然而，法院引用了《土地所有權法》，其認為在立遺囑人去世後，申請人以遺產受託人的身份成為該財產的註冊所有者，是很明確且沒有爭議。因此，該財產享有與立遺囑人相同的權利和利益。
它發現遺囑的語言應理解為，「允許，但不強制」將財產從遺產轉移給申請人和被告。因此法院認為，應由申請人作為遺產受託人來決定如何最好地實現財產的贈與，並且如果她如此選擇，她有權出售該財產，但須遵守她對遺產和作為遺產受益人的被告所承擔的通常信託責任。
因此，被告被給予 60 天的時間騰出房產，並被禁止從該房產移走任何房地產資產(Sheffield (Estate) v Sheffield, 2024 ONSC 3627).。
de Vries Litigation 合夥人Rebecca Studin評論：「如果立遺囑人在遺囑中就如何落實不動產贈與表達相反意圖，則遺產受託人有權出售該財產，而對該財產擁有權益的受益人沒有自動佔用權。」
Wel Partners 律師 Evan Pernica 補充道：「遺產受託人的權力範圍將由死者遺囑的措辭（整體和具體）以及相關法定權力決定。」、「就不動產而言，這些資產不會在立遺囑人去世後自動歸屬於隨後的受益人，佔有權在最初的終身權益到期時進一步具體化，而是會作為所有者登記在遺產受託人處。」
Canadian court considers trustee’s ability to sell estate assets after expiry of initial life interest
The Superior Court of Ontario has found that an estate trustee was empowered to sell real property when the subject of a life interest passed away, rather than the title passing to the beneficiaries.
The case was contested by the estate trustee, Katherine Markolefas (the applicant), and her brother Bradley Sheffield (the respondent). They are the only surviving children of Gary Sheffield (the testator) and Donna Sheffield.
The testator died in 2020 and pursuant to his will his widow was granted the right to reside in the contested property for “as long as she is able”, remaining “responsible for the taxes, utilities and insurance.” The widow died in 2023 and the testator’s will provided that the property would then pass to the applicant and the respondent “in equal shares per capita.”
The applicant alleged that during their mother’s life tenancy, she and the respondent did not conduct necessary repairs and maintenance, nor did they allow the applicant access to do so herself, leading to the deterioration of the property. It was also not insured. The applicant therefore sought orders to allow the estate to sell the property and prevent the respondent from removing estate assets from the property.
The respondent continued to live there and argued that the will conferred a right to possession and therefore occupancy of the property. He argued that his and the applicant’s interest in the property vested on the testator’s death, including a right to possession of the property subject to their mother’s life tenancy. He claimed that their entitlement to possession of the property crystallised at the time of their mother’s death.
Conversely, the applicant took the position that she was entitled to liquidate all the estate assets of the estate and distribute them in cash. She argued that the will did not require her to retain the property for the respondent’s benefit or to distribute his share of the property to him in kind.
The court noted that the testator’s will did not prescribe how the gift of the property was to be effected or how the title should pass. However, it cited the Land Titles Act to find that “it is clear (and not disputed) that following the death of [the testator], [the applicant], in her capacity as Estate Trustee, became the registered owner of the Property…and, as such, held the Property subject to the same rights and interests as [the testator] had.”
It found that the language of the will should be read as “permitting, but not mandating” the transfer of the property from the estate to the applicant and respondent. The court was “therefore of the view that it is up to the applicant, as the Estate Trustee, to determine how best to give effect to the gift of the Property, and that if she so chooses, she is empowered to sell the Property, subject to the usual fiduciary responsibilities she would owe to the Estate and to the respondent as a beneficiary of the Estate.”
Accordingly, the respondent was given 60 days to vacate the property and banned from removing any estate assets from the property (Sheffield (Estate) v Sheffield, 2024 ONSC 3627).
“Absent a contrary intention of the testator expressed in the Will as to how to give effect to a gift of real property, an estate trustee is empowered to sell the property, and a beneficiary with an interest in the property has no automatic right to occupancy,” comments Rebecca Studin, Partner at de Vries Litigation.
“The scope of [the estate trustee’s] authority will be determined by the wording of the Deceased’s will, both holistically and specifically, as well as relevant statutory authorities,” adds Evan Pernica, lawyer at Wel Partners. “With respect to real property, these asset(s) will not automatically vest in subsequent beneficiaries upon the death of the testator, with possessory rights further crystalizing upon the expiry the initial life interest but will instead be registered to the Estate Trustee as owner.”
Sources:
• CanLII
• Wel Partners
• All About Estates