鰥夫將被允許繼承其已故妻子的剩餘遺產，儘管他承認在瑞士的一家診所幫助她自殺身亡。
英格蘭和威爾斯高等法院（EWHC）的判決確認，僅僅陪伴一個人到他們打算結束自己生命的地方的行為並不構成協助自殺（Morris v Morris, 2024 EWHC 2554 Ch）。
Myra Morris（死者）於 2023 年 12 月 5 日在利斯塔爾的 Pegasos 診所去世，享年 73 歲。兩年來，她一直患有無法治癒的退化性神經系統疾病多系統萎縮症。驗屍官在驗屍時指出，她的病情已經惡化到幾乎無法享受生活的地步，一直處於痛苦之中，並且發現自己難以對抗病情。
各方均認為死者是自行服用過量戊巴比妥結束了自己的生命。為此，她獲得了 Pegasos 診所工作人員和她的丈夫Myra Morris（索賠人）的幫助，後者和他們的兩個成年孩子陪同她。索賠人還協助他的妻子做出必要的行政安排，以便她前往診所。所有這些都足以涉及《1961年自殺法》（《1961年法案》）第2（1）條的協助自殺條款，因此原則上《1982年沒收法》中規定的沒收規則將阻止索賠人繼承資產死者離開了他。
死者於2021年12月立下遺囑。這使得她的剩餘財產絕對由原告以信託方式持有，並在此前提下，由他們的兩個成年子女絕對平等分享。
《沒收法》第 2(2) 條允許申請救濟，修改沒收規則的效力，以允許原告從死者繼承遺產。Myra Morris提出了這樣的申請。
EWHC 詳細了解了原告在這起事件中的行為，包括死者在去世前不久所作的證人證詞。這一說法得到了她的律師同時發表的證人證詞之支持，該證詞評估死者俱有根據 2005年《精神能力法》所載原則做出知情和自願決定結束自己生命的精神能力。死者能夠理解她所做的決定感到滿意，並且在她這樣做時沒有受到不當影響、壓力或鼓勵。
法院也考慮了檢察長於2010年2月發布並於2014年10月更新的《檢察官處理慫恿或協助自殺案件的政策》。法官逐一審查了 16 個有利於起訴的因素，得出的結論是，本案中不存在這些因素。
關於索賠人的行為，EWHC得出的結論是，在索賠人開始採取任何能夠構成援助的步驟之前，死者已做出自願、明確、安定和知情的自殺決定。此外，法院還發現，死者俱有完全的行為能力，並在她去世前一直堅持這一決定，原告完全是出於同情心，從未鼓勵過她自殺，而且確實曾試圖勸阻她不要這樣做。法院還指出，原告已向警方報告了這起死亡事件，並表示願意協助警方進行任何調查。事件發生後，警方沒有採取進一步行動。
EWHC 引用 Dunbar v Plant (1998 Ch 412) 判決中的原則聲明，得出結論認為，沒有證據表明原告對所發生的事情負有道德責任。因此，有充分的理由使他免受沒收規則的所有影響。此外，死者遺囑的所有受益人都同意原告所尋求的救濟。 EWHC 正式批准了這項救濟，完全排除了沒收規則的適用。
剩下的問題是在同一案件的先前聽證會上出現的一個問題：即這兩個孩子是否因與死者一起前往瑞士診所而導致自己面臨被沒收的風險。這種可能性最初是在 Ninian v. Findlay 案（2019 EWHC 297 Ch）中提出的，該案表明，根據該案的事實，與死者同行前往瑞士的行為本身就是一種行為1961年法案第2(1 ) 條意義內的援助。
EWHC的觀點是事實並非如此。報告指出，「法院面臨的問題始終是，任何特定行為，是否屬於行為過程的一部分，是否「能夠鼓勵或協助自殺」。這是一個客觀問題，它說：雖然陪伴死者有時可能是表明協助意圖的行為過程的一部分，但情況不一定如此。法院表示，孩子們在那裡的唯一目的是透過他們的存在為死者提供安慰，他們所做的任何事情都不會鼓勵死者自殺。因此，他們在她的遺產中的利益並沒有喪失。
Accompanying deceased to Swiss clinic does not by itself amount to assisting suicide, EWHC rules
A widower is to be allowed to inherit the residue of his late wife's estate even though he admitted assisting her death by suicide at a clinic in Switzerland.
The England and Wales High Court (EWHC) judgment confirms that the mere act of accompanying a person to a place where they intend to end their own life does not amount to assisting a suicide (Morris v Morris, 2024 EWHC 2554 Ch).
Myra Morris (the deceased) died on 5 December 2023 aged 73 at the Pegasos clinic in Liestal. For two years, she had been suffering from the incurable degenerative neurological disorder Multiple System Atrophy. The coroner at her inquest noted that her condition had deteriorated to the point where she had little enjoyment from life, was in constant pain and found it very difficult to cope.
It was accepted by all parties that the deceased ended her own life by self-administration of an overdose of pentobarbital. To do so, she had obtained assistance from Pegasos clinic staff and from her husband, Philip Morris (the claimant), who had accompanied her along with their two adult children. The claimant had also assisted his wife in making the necessary administrative arrangements for her to travel to the clinic. All this was enough to engage the assisted suicide provisions of s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (the 1961 Act), so that in principle the forfeiture rule as codified in the Forfeiture Act 1982 would prevent the claimant from inheriting the assets the deceased left him.
The deceased had made a will in December 2021. It left her residuary estate to be held on trust for the claimant absolutely and, subject to that, for their two adult children in equal shares absolutely.
Section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act allows applications for relief modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule so as to allow the claimant to inherit from the deceased. Philip Morris brought such an application.
The EWHC was given a detailed account of the claimant’s conduct in the affair, including a witness statement made by the deceased shortly before she died. This was supported by a witness statement made at the same time by her solicitor, who assessed the deceased as having the mental capacity to make an informed and voluntary decision to end her own life according to the principles contained in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The solicitor said that she was satisfied that the deceased was able to understand the decisions she was making and was under no undue influence, pressure or encouragement when she did so.
The court also considered the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions in February 2010 and updated in October 2014. This listed the public interest factors which tend in favour of and against prosecution. The judge examined each of the 16 factors which tend in favour of prosecution, and concluded that none of them were present in the current case.
Regarding the claimant’s conduct, the EWHC concluded that the deceased had made a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to die by suicide before the claimant started to take any steps capable of amounting to assistance. Further, it found that the deceased had full capacity and maintained that decision throughout the period up to her death and that the claimant was wholly motivated by compassion, had never encouraged to take her own life and indeed had sought to dissuade her from doing so. The court also noted that the claimant had reported the death to the police and offered to assist them in any enquiries. In the event, the police took no further steps.
Citing the statement of principle in the judgment from Dunbar v Plant (1998 Ch 412), the EWHC concluded that there was no evidence of the claimant’s moral culpability for what had happened. Strong grounds therefore existed for relieving him from all effects of the forfeiture rule. Moreover, all beneficiaries of the deceased’s will consented to the relief the claimant sought. The EWHC duly granted that relief, fully excluding the application of the forfeiture rule.
The remaining issue was one that had arisen in a previous hearing in the same case: namely, whether the two children, by travelling with the deceased to the Swiss clinic, had rendered themselves open to forfeiture. The possibility had been originally raised in the case of Ninian v Findlay (2019 EWHC 297 Ch), which suggested that, on the facts of that case, the very act of travelling to Switzerland in the company of the deceased was of itself an act of assistance within the meaning of section 2(1) of the 1961 Act.
The EWHC’s view was that it was not. 'The question for the court is always whether any particular acts, whether or not part of a course of conduct, are “capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide”', it noted. This was an objective question, it said: though accompanying the deceased may sometimes be part of a course of conduct that indicated intent to assist, this would not necessarily be the case. The children's only intention in being there was to provide comfort to the deceased by their presence and nothing they did was capable of encouraging her death by suicide, the court said. Accordingly, their interests in her estate are not forfeit.
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• BAILII